Encryption using vector decomposition problem (VDP) on higher dimensional vector spaces is a novel method in cryptography. Yoshida has shown that the VDP on a two-dimensional vector space is at least as hard as the computational Diffie-Hellman problem on a one-dimensional subspace under certain conditions. Steven Galbraith has shown that for certain curves, the VDP is at most as hard as the discrete logarithm problem on a one-dimensional subspace. Okomoto and Takashima proposed encryption scheme and signature schemes using VDP. An authenticated key agreement scheme using vector decomposition problem is proposed in this paper.
INTRODUCTION
Many public key cryptosystems are designed based on the hardness of discrete logarithm problem (DLP) or computational diffie-hellman problem (CDHP). Vector decomposition problem (VDP), initially proposed by Yoshida 1, 2 , was introduced as an alternative to these problems. Yoshida provided some sufficient conditions for the equivalence of VDP and CDHP. Duursma and Kiyavash 3 proved that genus 1 curves satisfying these conditions are supersingular. Supersingular curves are not preferred for the use of VDP due to the existence of MOV -reduction or FR -reduction. Hence higher genus curves are preferred for the use of VDP. Okamoto 7 , et al. extended the idea of VDP into higher dimensional vector spaces. They introduced a homomorphic encryption and signature scheme using dual pairing vector spaces and a trapdoor function. Lim 6 , et al. introduced key substitution attack on Okamoto and Takashima scheme 7 . We make use of the hardness of VDP, curves given in papers 3, 7, 8 , the trapdoor given by Okamoto and Takashima   7 and a similar protocol given by So 9 , et al. to construct an authenticated key agreement scheme and also prove that key substitution attack 6 is not possible in our scheme.
Certificateless public key cryptography was introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson 10 . They introduced a key generating center (KGC) and shown that the trust required on KGC is much less than that required on private key generator (PKG) in identity based public key cryptography and certifying authority (CA) in traditional certificate based schemes. But the protocol lacks the resistance towards leakage of ephemeral keys 11 . Though Swanson and Jao 11 suggests that the problem can be fixed, they also claim that this fix is not strong. Mandt and Tan 12 proposed a protocol that satisfy all the security properties of Al-Riyami and Paterson protocol. But Swanson and Jao 11 proved that Mandit and Tan 12 protocol is not resistant towards the leakage of ephemeral information and also shown that Mandt and Tan protocol admits key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack. In all these schemes KGC can launch a manin-middle attack. Lippod
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, et.al. proposed a scheme which is provably secure in a suitable security model, extended Carnetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model 11 . The scheme is secure under bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, but requires ten pairing computations per party. The number of pairing computations can be reduced to five pairings per party under gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.
We propose a scheme similar to Al-Riyami and Paterson 10 . The security of our scheme is depending on the hardness of vector decomposition problem (VDP). In our scheme KGC used in paper 10 is the master authority which also acts similar to private key generator (PKG) in the identity based encryption scheme by Boneh and Franklin 14 . But in each session of our scheme, entity chooses a new random number to establish the session key. Though PKG knows the private key, the presence of the random number makes this key as a partial private key and solves key escrow problem in identity based cryptography. The users are required to register with the master authority, PKG initially. PKG generates its own secret key, say, master secret key. By using this master key, secret keys are provided to users who register with it. The amount of trust invested on PKG in the proposed scheme is less than that required in Al-Riyami and Patterson, but our scheme requires a trusted directory of public keys. The knowledge of full secret key of the user will give negligible advantage to PKG. This is explained in detail in the later section. Hence we do not require the double encryption used in certificateless cryptographic schemes. Registration is a one time process. Once the registration is successfully over, these registered users can communicate among themselves without contacting the PKG again. This reduces the key exchange traffic. our scheme does not require digital certificates for authentication and thus solves the problem of managing too many digital certificates. Three points on an elliptic curve are used as public key and another point as private key and hence public and private keys are short. Moreover, our scheme requires no pairing computation during encryption and requires only six pairing computation during decryption. The scheme has both forward secrecy and backward secrecy. To provide freshness to the session key, we use a hybrid method suggested by Mitchell 15 . Our proposed scheme permits the user to choose the five random numbers out of six random numbers used for encryption (The remaining one is dependant on two of these five random numbers). The initiator can make use of one of the numbers as a counter based on real time. This provides freshness to the key and prevents replay attack.
PRELIMINARIES
A bilinear map is a function 1 2 3 : 
Vector Decomposition Problem
Okamoto and Takashima 7 introduced VDP in higher dimensions and the concept of dual pairing vector spaces. The higher dimensional VDP is defined as follows. 
be the security parameter of a set up algorithm that outputs a n − dimensional F p -vector space V, m < n and A be a probabilistic polynomial time machine. , ,.., n P P P V ∈ and 1 2 , ,.., . 
Trapdoor for VDP
For constructing a trapdoor for solving VDP in higher dimension, Okamoto and Takashima 7 introduced the concept called distortion eigenvector space for higher dimension. This vector space has efficiently computable distortion maps and bilinear operators.
Definition 2.4 Distortion eigenvector space V is a n -dimensional vector space over F, that satisfies the following conditions:
1. There exist A, F and 
Let V be a distortion eigenvector space and 1 2 ( , ,.., ) v as the sum of two vectors where one lies in the subspace generated by 1 2 ( , ,.., ) m P P P , m < n and the other lies in the subspace generated by 1 2 ( , ,.., ) 
is a matrix where ij p u F ∈ such that det = 0 X / . 1 P , 2 P ,.., n P are points generated by X such that 1 2 = ( , ,.., )
= { , ,.., } n B P P P . Hence B also forms a basis. Here ( , , ) V A B is the public parameter.
Equivalent Public Keys and Key Substitution Attack
In key substitution attack, a malicious adversary generates an alternate public key corresponding to the public key of an authorised user. Let pk and σ be the public key and signature of the authorised user for a given message. The adversary D tries to find an alternate public key pk′ and a signature ′ σ corresponding to the parameters pk and σ of the user for the given message. That is, for a given message m , ′ σ is also a valid signature with respect to the new public key (= ) pk pk ′ / . To perform the attack, if the adversary does not require the secret key sk′ , corresponding to the new public key pk′ , it is called strong key substitution(SKS) attack, otherwise weak key substitution attack. Lim et.al. 6 showed the following Signature-equivalent public keys and encryption-equivalent public keys existing in the Okamoto and Takashima scheme 7 and demonstrated a SKS attack.
Signature-equivalent Public Keys
Definition 3.1 For two key pairs ( , ) pk sk and ( , ) pk sk ′ ′ in a signature scheme, the public key pk′ is signature-equivalent to the public key pk if ( , , 
Encryption-equivalent Public Keys Definition 3.2 For two key pairs ( , )
pk sk and ( , ) pk sk ′ ′ in an encryption scheme, the public key pk′ is encryption-equivalent to the public key pk if ( , 
PROPOSED AUTHENTICATED KEY AGREEMENT SCHEME
We propose an authenticated key agreement scheme using vector decomposition. The trapdoor function described in Section 2.2 is used for decryption and authentication in the proposed scheme. Let / p E F be a hyper elliptic curve and = { , , } B P P P , where 1 P , 2 P and 3 P are points generated by X such that : ( , , ) P P P , ( , , ). S T U The transformation matrix X is kept as secret.
The proposed key agreement scheme could be implemented in networks. Our scheme consists of two phases. The device registration with private key generator (PKG) is performed in phase-I. Once the registration is successfully over, phase-II which contains data packet transmission and reception begins.
Master She uses this secret key for establishing any session key in the network. Once this registration is successfully over, Alice can communicate with any other registered device in the network using this scheme.
Data Packet Transmission:
Alice performs the following procedure for the key establishment and authentication.
• Choose the public keys of Bob , , which is the lHS of (3).
Comparison with Okamoto and Takashima

Scheme
The primary aim of Okamoto and Takashima encryption scheme was to construct a two party protocol to securely evaluate a 2DnF formula over n variables. In their scheme 7 , the decryption requires the computation of eCDlP. Hence in Okamoto and Takashima encryption scheme, the message is selected from a logarithmically small space. The proposed scheme requires six pairing computations whereas okamoto and Takashima scheme requires four pairing computations. The security of both schemes are based on the hardness of VDP. But the complexity of message extraction after performing vector decomposition in Okamoto and Takashima scheme is exponential (unless the message is selected from a logarithmically small space). Since our scheme requires only 1 k B (and not 1 k ), the key establishment is accomplished by the decomposition of c B which can be done in polynomial time. Hence the computational complexity of our scheme is less than that of Okamoto and Takashima scheme.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Security of our scheme is based on the hardness of vector decomposition problem and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (eCDlP). Since the curve used satisfies yoshida conditions 1 , VDP is atleast as hard as CDHP and even after MOV -reduction DlP is hard on these curves. Hence the scheme is secure. Theorem1 by Okamoto and Takashima 7 compares the hardness of gCVDP and gCDHP Although most of the schemes can agree on general definitions, their ideas diverge when precision is required and all attacks must be considered relative to the protocol goals 16 . We consider two types of adversaries as explained by Al-Riyami and Paterson 10 and Swanson and Jao
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. Type-I adversary or outside adversary is one who can replace the public key of the user, but does not have access to the master secret key. If the adversary make ReplacePublicKey command, alteration will be made in the public parameters of party B . In Section 5.2 and proposition 5.1 in Section 5.1, we shown that the advantage of such adversary is negligible. Type-II adversary or inside adversary has the access to master secret key but cannot alter the public keys. Any adversary who knows the master key used in the scheme or the partial private key used in some session, gets negligible advantage. This is because extracting 1 K B from c B requires solving VDP, and hence only the receiver can compute 1 1 ( ,
B e t K B e t Sk ≠ , the receiver can realize that it has not been sent by Alice.
Key Substitution Attack
Proposition 5.1 Let , , 
